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COMMENT
COPYRIGHT LAW-Copyright of Fraudulent Material
Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1973)
The Constitution does not establish copyrights, but provides
that Congress shall have the power to grant such rights if it thinks
fit. Not primarily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for the
benefit of the public, such rights are given. Not that any particular
class of citizens, however worthy, may benefit, but because the pol-
icy is believed to be for the benefit of the great body of people, in
that it will stimulate writing and invention to give some bonus to
authors and inventors.'
INTRODUCTION
The Copyright Act of 1909, the predecessor of the present
Title 17,1 was passed with the intention of providing the greatest
benefit for the public. Congress derived its authority from the
Consitution which empowers Congress "[t]o promote the Prog-
ress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." 3 The sole object of the Constitution,
and the primary purpose in conferring copyright protection, "lie
in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of
authors."4 It is predicated on the concept that the public benefits
from the creativity of authors, and that the copyright protection
is necessary to encourage such creative activities.5
In the recent case Belcher v. Tarbox,' the Ninth Circuit al-
lowed copyright protection to material which was considered
against the public interest, and, therefore, contrary to the avowed
purpose and intent of the Copyright Act. The case involved a
written handicapping system designed for winning at the horse-
races. The author had acquired copyright privileges by affixing
the proper notice to his works and by applying for registration
with the copyright office pursuant to the Copyright Act.7 The
defendant was the publisher of a magazine which reproduced
H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909), accompanying the bill embodying
the Copyright Act of 1909, Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.
2 17 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 215 (1952).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as NIMMER].
486 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1973).
The procedure for obtaining copyright protection is codified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11,
13, 19, 20, 21 (1970).
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various sytems for betting on horses. The defendant reprinted
several of the author's systems, and the author instituted an ac-
tion for copyright infringement. As a defense, the defendant
argued that the plaintiff's works were not entitled to copyright
protection since they, and the advertising associated with them,
made fraudulent representations to the public. The trial court
found, in fact, that one of the works was fraudulent and not
entitled to protection from infringement. The issue which the
appellate court resolved was whether "false and fraudulent mate-
rial [is] entitled to copyright protection or does the clean hands
doctrine preclude it?"' The Ninth Circuit, not following the
weight of precedent law, asserted that fraudulent material was
copyrightable and, in this case, had been infringed.
The purpose of this comment is to explore the implications
of the Belcher decision by examining the historical precedents of
copyright protection for fraudulent material; by drawing analo-
gies to the copyrightablility of immoral and illegal works and to
the relation of fraud in trademark and patent law; and by analyz-
ing the court's opinion in the present case. Finally, the implica-
tions of Belcher on the field of copyright law will be discussed to
determine whether fraudulent works should be the subject of co-
pyright protection.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Fraud in Copyright Cases
1. Copyright Law in England
Early copyright protection consisted of printers' licenses
granted by the King about the time the printing press was devel-
oping.9 The primary purpose of these licenses was to restrict cir-
culation of anti-government and anti-Church literature. In 1662,
Parliament passed the Licensing Act requiring licensing and reg-
istration of every published book with the Stationers' Company.
This act prohibited the printing of "heretical, seditious, schis-
matical or offensive books or pamphlets,"'" and required a licens-
ing notice in each copy which was enforceable against pirates by
criminal penalties. The Licensing Act expired in 1679, however,
and new legislation was not enacted until 1709 with the passage
486 F.2d at 1088.
W. COPINGER & E. JAMES, COPINGER & SKONE JAMES ON COPYRIGHT § 21 (11th ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as COPINGER].
11 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 33, § 2 (1662).
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of the Copyright Act" wherein authors were granted a 14-year
monopoly on their works published after 1710. The 1709 Copy-
right Act remained the law in England until revisions were made
in the 19th century.'2
The preamble to the 1842 Act to Amend the Law of Copy-
right expressed the object of copyright protection "to afford
greater Encouragement to the Production of literary Works of
lasting Benefit to the World."' 3 This theme pervades early Eng-
lish copyright law and the court's concern with the public interest
is demonstrated in Wright v. Talis, '4 an early case on fraud in
copyright. Wright involved an action for appropriating a work of
devotional character which falsely professed to be a translation
from an esteemed German author. The plaintiff intentionally
deceived the purchasers in order to receive a higher value for his
work than it was worth. In denying copyright protection, the
court drew an analogy from the prior immorality cases stating:
The cases in which a copyright has been held not to subsist
where the work is subversive of good order, morality, or religion, do
not, indeed, bear directly on the case before us; but they have this
analogy with the present inquiry - that they prove that the rule
which denies the existence of copyright in those cases, is a rule
established for the benefit and protection of the public. And we
think that that the law can afford to the public against such a fraud
as that laid open by this plea, is, to make the practice of it unprofita-
ble to its author."5
The English courts again denied copyright protection in
Slingsby v. Bradford Patent Truck, Co.'" The plaintiff published
an illustrated catalogue of trucks and trolleys which he allegedly
manufactured. The catalogue suggested that he was the inventor,
patentee, and sole maker of the vehicles, but in fact he held no
English patents for them. The plaintiff was denied an injunction
against the infringing defendant since his statements about being
a true patentee were calculated to deceive the public and increase
his trade.
Although the copyright law in England is devoid of any sta-
tutory restriction on fraudulent material, the few early cases indi-
cate the judicial concern for the public interest, the stated pur-
" 8 Anne, c. 19, § 1 (1709).
12 COPINGER, supra note 9, §§ 21-30.
5 & 6 Vict., c. 45, § 1 (1842).
" 135 Eng. Rep. 794 (C.P. 1845).
Id. at 800.
[1905] W.N. 122; [1906] W.N. 51.
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pose of the Copyright Acts, by denying copyright protection
where the public was injured by the works of the copyright holder.
2. Copyright Law in the United States
The early development of copyright law in the United States
followed the precedent set in England. The United States Consti-
tution adopted existing common law at the time and granted
Congress the authority to legislate copyright law.' 7 The first
American statute was entitled An Act for the Encouragement of
Learning. 8 This act provided protection similar to that existing
in England, and did not specifically deny or allow copyright pro-
tection on fraudulent material. American copyright law has un-
dergone several statutory changes including expansions to extend
protection to the arts of designing, engraving, and etching
prints;1 musical compositions;20 dramatic compositions;2' photo-
graphs; 2 and paintings, drawings, and statues.23 The copyright
law was finally revised in 1909 with the Copyright Act 2' which
substantively became Title 17, enacted in 1947. Nowhere in this
statutory law is there an express limitation on copyright protec-
tion on fraudulent matter.
Turning to early American case law, copyright protection
was denied in Davies v. Bowes,25 an infringement action where the
defendant constructed and produced a play based on a fictional
story which the plaintiff-reporter had written in his newspaper
column. The court said that copyright does not exist in news,
since facts are public property. The plaintiff presented the story
to the public as if it were news, in order to attract attention and
interest, and the court denied protection as a matter of morals
saying that, "he who puts forth a thing as verity shall not be
heard to allege for profit that it is fiction.
'2 6
The major precedent-setting case dealing with the copyright
of fraudulent material is Stone & McCarrick, Inc. v. Dugan Piano
Co.2 Stone involved an instruction manual for the selling of pi-
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171.
Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436.
21 Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138.
22 Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540.
1 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198.
24 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.
209 F. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
" Id. at 55.
11 220 F. 837 (5th Cir. 1915).
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anos which contained advertisement forms for special sales to be
held by the dealers. The forms contained sales statements which
could not be true for all cases. In denying copyright protection to
the manual the court stated that "the law should extend its pro-
tection to those advertisements only that speak the truth, and
certainly not to that class of advertising matter the effect of which
is to mislead and deceive the public." 8 This case, as are most in
this area, was not decided on a principle of copyright law, but
instead on a doctrine of equity. The court said, "It is a familiar
maxim of equity that one who applies to a court of equity for relief
should come in with clean hands . .."" The effect of this appli-
cation is not really to deny the copyright, but only to refuse to
enforce the copyright by not enjoining the one who has infringed
it.
Deutsch v. Felton3 1 took a different view. Deutsch involved
the infringement of a graphology chart used to predict character
traits through handwriting analysis. The court held that the co-
pyright had been infringed and issued an injunction against the
defendant despite the fact that neither the plaintiff nor the defen-
dant claimed that the charts were based on scientific or other
fact. The court declined to consider whether this was adverse to
the public interest.
In Advisers, Inc. v. Wiesen-Hart, Inc. 31 a coupon book, which
offered discounts on jewelry purchases, was produced and distrib-
uted by the plaintiff. The coupon book was advertised as being
worth $100, but the discounts which it offered were available to
any customer. An action for infringement was brought against the
defendant who published a similar book. The court found the
material to be fraudulent, 3 but proceeded to conclude that it was
Id. at 841. The court continues:
It is only necessary to glance at the matter of the advertisements . ..to
satisfy the mind that their tendency, by the extravagant puffing of the wares
of the dealer and misrepresentations of sales, is to mislead and deceive the
public . . . .Extravaganzas may be indulged by a writer for the purpose of
illustration and to accomplish the end in view . . . .But advertisements by
dealers of their wares, in order to insure the protection of the law, should
reflect the truth and avoid representations which mislead and deceive the
people. If their tendency be misleading and deceptive, they will find the
doors of a court of equity barred against their admission.
Id. at 842-43.
Id. at 841.
27 F. Supp. 895 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
161 F. Supp. 831 (S.D. Ohio 1958).
32 The court stated:
The Court finds as a fact that the plaintiffs "Cash $100 Book" is fraudulent
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the proper subject matter for copyright protection and issued an
injunction against the defendant. The court stated, however, that
the statutory damages of $1 per copy provided for in the Copy-
right Act were not intended to be awarded to material which was
fraudulent. The court did, nevertheless, grant general damages.
Two recent cases have also dealt with fraud in copyright; one
applying the clean hands doctrine of equity to deny copyright
protection, 33 and the other finding the conduct inconsequential to
warrant application of the doctrine .3 The above discussion dem-
onstrates the fact that there is no clear authority in the United
States dealing with copyright protection for fraudulent material.
In fact, the authority is very limited since only two cases, Stone
and Advisers, deal with actual fraudulent content, as distin-
guished from fraudulent representations made surrounding the
work. Furthermore, even Stone and Advisers are split as to the
effect of such fraudulent content in relation to the Copyright Act.
3. The Status of Copyright Law for Fraudulent Material
The question of whether a copyright should be granted to
material having fraudulent content which is, therefore, contrary
to the purpose and intent of the Copyright Act in protecting the
public interest, as discussed above, has rarely been confronted.
The most common method for approaching this problem by the
courts has been not to deny the granting of the copyright but
rather to refuse enjoining the copyright based on the equitable
doctrine of clean hands. This apparent granting of a token copy-
right with a judicial denial of statutory rights and remedies does
not follow the principles of equity. One authority on equity, Kerr,
has stated the rule of equity thusly:
in nature in that it is used for the sole and express purpose of enticing the
gullible into those business establishments whose merchandise is advertised
in the book under the guise that the book is worth $100 in cash, where in
fact the same discounts specified in the book are given to all members of the
public in the ordinary course of business.
Id. at 834.
m International Biotical Corp. v. Associated Mills, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 511, 514-15
(N.D. Ill. 1964). The plaintiff's design patent and copyrights were unenforceable because
he had made prior misrepresentations to the court and the copyright office about prior
publications, and to the public through fraudulent advertising.
u Ideal Toy Corp. v. J-Cey Doll Co., 290 F.2d 710, 711 (2d Cir. 1961). The plaintiff
was granted an injunction against the infringing defendant on a copyrighted doll with a
distinctive head despite the claim that the doll's body had been previously published
without copyright notice, and the plaintiffs copyright notice on the torso of the new doll,
therefore, was an attempt to extend protection to the torso, rather than the whole doll,
and constituted a fraud upon the public.
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If a publication be of an immoral, indecent, seditious, libellous,
or irreligious nature, there can be no copyright. The labor expended
on a work of this nature is not labor in respect of which a right of
property can exist. Upon an analogous principle no copyright exists
in a book, though its contents be innocent, which purports falsely
to have been written by an author of reputation, and seeks . . .
[intentionally] to defraud the public and make a profit by a false
representation .5
Kerr, therefore, states that copyright simply does not exist in
such fraudulent works. The courts continue, however, to apply
the clean hands doctrine of equity to deny enforcement, while
recognizing the existence of copyright. This irony underscores the
conflict which exists in the administration of copyright law. It is
noteworthy that Kerr uses the Wright case based on fraud to
support the other bars to copyright which he enumerated.
A more recent copyright commentator narrows the scope of
the clean hands doctrine by stating that the transgression by the
plaintiff must be of serious proportions and relate directly to the
subject matter of the infringement action before the courts will
apply the doctrine and deny protection.
3
Despite this apparent fear by the courts to confront the fraud
in copyrighted works, there is a pervasive theme throughout the
case law that suggests that works which defeat the purpose of
copyright law by defrauding, rather than benefiting, the public
should not be protected from infringement. The courts have used
the clean hands doctrine to accomplish this purpose. Not all
courts have followed this theme, however, and, absent any clear
authority which states that copyright does not exist in fraudulent
material, the question remains unsolved. Analogies to other areas
of copyright law and to the handling of fraud in trademark and
patent cases, therefore, may offer insights and guidelines for solv-
ing this issue.
B. Immorality and Illegality in Copyright Analogies
No specific statutory authority exists for denying copyright
protection to works which are immoral or illegal, but the case law
abounds with instances where, in the interest of benefiting the
public, courts have denied such protection. The rule of law gener-
ally used is:
The publication of an immoral, seditious, blasphemous, or libellous
W. KERR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INJUNCTIONS 1N EQurry, 452
(American ed. 1871) (footnotes omitted).
1 2 M. NIMmER, supra, note 5, at § 149.2.
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work, is looked upon as unlawful; and for that reason it has been
held that such a work cannot be the subject of statutory copyright.
Hence, when the author has published a work of this kind, he is
powerless to prevent any other person from republishing it, and he
is not entitled to recover for damages sustained through loss of prof-
its by such unauthorized publication 7
1. Obscenity and Immorality
The cases dealing with immorality can be divided into two
groups: those which offend public decency with obscenity and
those which are used for immoral purposes. In the first group
copyright protection has been denied for the infringement of a
book which the court found to be highly indecent and slander-
ous; 38 for the infringement of a dramatic composition which the
court found to he ".rossly indecent, and calculated to corrupt the
morals of the people";3 9 for the infringement of a song whose verse
was held to be indelicate and vulgar;" for the infringement of a
performance containing moving pictures of a woman making
quick costume changes and exhibiting portions of her anatomy
which the court found to be lascivious and immoral;" and for the
infringement of movies which the court found to be indecent and
disgusting. 2 In an English case, the court stated in dictum that
indecent films would have been equally disentitled to protection
of the court because of their offensive character. 3 As this discus-
sion indicates, the courts have been quick to deny copyright pro-
' E. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 112 (1879) [hereinafter cited as DRONE]. See also
COPINGER, supra note 9, at § 224, where he uses the words, "libellous, immoral, obscene,
or irreligious" to describe works not protected as a matter of public policy.
' Stockdale v. Onwhyn, 108 Eng. Rep. 65 (K.B. 1826). Abbott, C.J. stated: "In order
to establish such a claim, he must, in the first place, shew a right to sell; for if he has not
that right, he cannot sustain any loss by an injury to the sale. Now I am certain no lawyer
can say that the sale of each copy of this work is not an offense against the law." Id. at
176, 108 Eng. Rep. at 66.
3' Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920, 922 (No. 9,173) (C.C. Cal. 1867). The court
stated: "Now, it cannot be denied that this spectacle of the Black Crook only attracts
attention as it panders to a prurient curiousity or an obscene imagination by very ques-
tionable exhibitions and attitudes of the female person." Id. Accord, Shook v. Daly, 49
How. Pr. 366 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1875).
'0 Broder v. Zeno Mauvais Music Co., 88 F. 74 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1898). The vulgarity
involved the word hottest as used in the song verse, "She's the hottest thing you ever
seen." Id. at 79.
41 Barnes v. Miner, 122 F. 480 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1903). The court stated: "Society may
tolerate, and even patronize, such exhibitions, but Congress has no constitutional author-
ity to enact a law that will copyright them, and the courts will not degrade themselves
when they recognize them as entitled to the protection of the law." Id. at 492.
42 Bullard v. Esper, 72 F. Supp. 548 (N.D. Tex. 1947).
' Glyn v. Western Feature Film Co., [1916] W.N. 5.
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tection where the copyrighted work offends public decency. The
major problem with this analogy is that changing social standards
of morality result in fluctuating definitions of obscenity. The cri-
teria used to assess morality in one year are obsolete in the next
year." The analogy is not lost, however, since the motivation of
the courts in these obscenity cases was a protection of the public
interest. Protection of the public interest was the same motiva-
tion used in copyright fraud cases, and is entirely in keeping with
the intent of the Copyright Act to benefit the public.
The second group of immoral works deals with those things
which are used for immoral purposes. The rule in this situation
is best stated in Richardson v. Miller4" where the court said that
in order to deprive a work of its protection under law, "it must
appear either that there is something immoral, pernicious, or
indecent in the things per se, or that they are incapable of any
use except in connection with some illegal and immoral act.""
Richardson involved the infringement of a copyright on playing
cards. Despite the assertion by the defendant that playing cards
have only the immoral and illegal use for gambling, the court
upheld the copyright since playing cards also have a legitimate
use. A similar result was attained in two other cases wherein form
charts of data about race horses and trotting horses were found
to have a legitimate purpose besides the obvious immoral one.
7
In a later case, 8 however, the court refused to give copyright
protection to a card which was allegedly infringed since it was
used exclusively in theaters to conduct lotteries during intermis-
sion. Thus, it is apparent that immorality associated with the use
of a thing may be the cause for the denial of copyright protection.
2. Libel, Sedition, and Blasphemy
Cases involving illegality as a cause for denial of copyright
primarily deal with something in the content of the work which
could create a disturbance of the public peace. Here again the
courts are primarily concerned with the public interest, as in-
tended by the Copyright Act, rather than the interests of the
" See Rogers, Copyright and Morals, 18 MICH. L. RaE. 390, 398 (1920), and Comment,
Immorality, Obscenity and the Law of Copyright, 6 S. DAK. L. Rav. 109, 115 (1961).
" 20 F. Cas. 722 (No. 11,791) (C.C. Mass. 1877).
4e Id. at 723.
" Egbert v. Greenberg, 100 F. 447 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900) involved form charts of past
performances of race horses which in theory could be used by breeders and trainers;
American Trotting Register Ass'n v. Gocher, 70 F. 237 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1895) involved lists
of trotters and pacers with a certain speed or better.
11 Kessler v. Schreiber, 39 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
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parties in litigation. These cases may be viewed in three groups:
libel, sedition, and blasphemy.
An early English libel case49 involved an action to restrain the
defendant from publishing the plaintiff's works in violation of an
agreement between them. Lord Eldon withheld an injunction
until he was satisfied that the works were not libelous, stating a
rule that equity should not offer relief until it is proved than an
action at law will lie.50 This opinion has been severely criticized
as creating the doctrine that judges must screen all material for
which injuctions are sought to determine if there is a right to an
action at law." The denial of legal protection for libelous works
was demonstrated in a later English case, Du Bost v. Beresford.2
Though not dealing with copyright, Du Bost involved the destruc-
tion of a painting in public exhibition which the defendant
claimed was a libel. The court restricted damages to the value
of the canvas and paint claiming that the picture had no legal
value as a work of art.
The major concern in sedition cases, as with libel, has been
the disturbance of the public peace by the publication of a work
which may expose the government to peril or serious embarrass-
ment. In such instances, the courts have been reluctant to grant
copyright protection.53 One early case 4 involved a song which
satirized the system of justice in England by suggesting that the
courts were corrupted by bribes. The song used the name of the
chief cashier of the Bank of England, whose signature appeared
on all bank notes, to infer that justice was not blind to money.
In an action for piracy, the defendant argued that the song was a
"nefarious libel upon the solemn administration of British jus-
tice,"55 and the court stated that, "[i]f the composition appeared
on the face of it to be a libel so gross as to affect the public morals,
I should advise the jury to give no damages."56 The court found,
however, that this song was not so gross a libel. Another English
case57 involved a poem written, but not published by the author.
" Walcot v. Walker, 32 Eng. Rep. 1 (Ch. 1802).
10 See Comment, supra note 44, at 110 and 111 n.6, for a discussion of Dr. Priestley's
Case from which Lord Eldon extracted his rule.
11 10 UVEs OF THE CHAcm.LoRs 254 (5th English ed.), quoted in DRONE, supra note
37, at 183-85 n.1.
52 170 Eng. Rep. 1235 (N.P. 1810).
DRONE, supra note 37, at 182.
54 Hime v. Dale, 2 Camp. 27 n.(b), (M.T. 1803).
Id. at 30 n.(b).
Id. at 31 n.(b).
57 Southey v. Sherwood, 35 Eng. Rep. 1006 (Ch. 1817).
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It was later acquired and published by the defendant. When the
author brought an action to restrain publication by the defen-
dant, the court, in dictum, stated that no relief was forthcoming
until the plaintiff proved that the publication was innocent since
the defendant had asserted that the poem was seditious.
The sedition of libel required to deny copyright protection
must be such as to justly threaten a breach of peace, or to inter-
fere with the functions of government. In the United States, the
first amendment protects satire, censure, and ridicule, and the
court's interpretations of that amendment define the extent to
which such works will be protected under law and, therefore,
copyrightable without being seditious or libelous.58 Libels on an
individual are considered as an offense against society and
treated in the same way.59 It is noteworthy that the recurrent
theme in the above discussed English cases is that copyright pro-
tection is based on the public interest and benefit.
The final group of cases involves blasphemy, an issue which
was a crime against society in Great Britain. In 1822, three cases
were decided in England and, in each case, the injunction to
restrain publication of pirated works was denied or dissolved be-
cause the works were suspected of being contrary to the Scrip-
tures. 0 The courts specifically stated that the law does not give
protection to those who contradict the Scriptures. In the United
States, however, where religious freedom is constitutionally guar-
anteed, such works would not cause a denial of copyright protec-
tion unless such works would interfere with the public order or
undermine the public morals."
3. The Analogy to Fraudulent Works
Early English case law supports the proposition that a
claim of copyright in a work of libellous, immoral, obscene or irreli-
gious tendency will not be enforced .... [and] the ground for
refusal by the courts to intervene is that it is against public policy
to protect rights of publication and sale of works, where publication
and sale would be against the public interest .... 12
The same rationale should apply equally to fraudulent material
since publication of such material is adverse to the public inter-
1 NIMMER, supra note 5, § 36 at 146.30.
5, DRONE, supra note 37, at 185.
' Lawrence v. Smith, 37 Eng. Rep. 928 (Ch. 1822); Murray v. Benbow, 37 Eng. Rep.
929 (Ch. 1822); Murray v. Dugdale, 32 Eng. Rep. 2 (Ch. 1823).
" DRONE, supra note 37, at 195.
62 COPINGER, supra note 9, § 224.
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est. At least one authority, Howell, has included fraudulent with
libelous, seditious, immoral, and indecent as the enumeration of
works which are unprotected. 3 Such inclusion was based on rea-
soning that for a work to be entitled to copyright it must be "free
from illegality or immorality."" Clearly, fraud is illegal. Ergo,
although there is scant authority, by analogy to other forms of
immoral and illegal works, it could be concluded that fraudulent
works are not subject to copyright.
C. Fraud in Trademark and Patent Law
Trademarks and patents are considered intellectual property
along with copyrights. Patent law 5 derives its authority from the
same source as copyright law."8 Although trademark law67 derives
its authority from the commerce clause, there are sufficient simi-
larities to make the analogy valid. The case law in both of these
areas abounds with examples of the court's use of the clean hands
doctrine to deny protection to one who has acted against the
public interest. Here again the concern of the law is to benefit the
public by granting limited monopolies to the authors and inven-
tors whose creativity produced works of value to the public.
1. Trademark Cases
As early as 1883, the Supreme Court denied protection in a
trademark infringement case involving medicine which had
fraudulent misrepresentations on its label.6 8 A similar case in-
volved a label which claimed the contents were "bottled at the
spring" when in fact it. was not. The court denied trademark
protection for a misdescriptive label which was against the public
interest. 9 A medicine with the trademark, "Syrup of Figs", was
denied protection in an infringement action when the defendant
proved that the plaintiff's constipation remedy actually con-
tained no extract of figs.7" The Supreme Court in that case refused
63 A. LATMAN, HOWELL'S COPYRIGHT LAW, 45 (4th ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as
HOWELL].
', Hoffman v. Le Traunik, 209 F. 375, 379 (N.D.N.Y. 1913).
Codified in 35 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 293 (1954).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
U Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427.
Manhattan Medicine Co. v. Wood, 108 U.S. 218 (1883). The Court denied protec-
tion to a medicine which made a misrepresentation on its label as to the manufacturer
and the place where it was manufactured declaring that the court of equity would not
protect one who practices a fraud on the public.
'5 Bear Lithia Springs Co. v. Great Bear Spring Co., 71 A. 383 (N.J. Ch. 1906).
70 Worden v. California Fig Syrup Co., 187 U.S. 516 (1903).
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relief to the plaintiff because he was guilty of deceit and misrepre-
sentations to the public. Two similar cases were cited therein.
One involved a product label which advertised "fruit puddine",
but no fruit was included in the ingredients.7' The other involved
a product claiming to be pure "pepper whiskey" but, in fact, was
a mixture of several whiskies including inferior grades.7" In both
cases, the courts denied an injunction on the ground that the
products were deceiving the public. In an 1897 case,73 trademark
protection was denied where the defendant produced a cigar with
a similar label as that of a well-established cigar. The defendant
argued that the label on the established cigar was deceiving since
it claimed to be pure Havana tobacco, but, in fact, contained
mostly tobaccos from other sources. The court, though finding the
defendant guilty of unfair competition, refused to aid the plaintiff
who was guilty of making materially false statements in connec-
tion with the property he sought to protect. Thus, the courts have
been unwilling to protect one who has abused his trademark priv-
ilege by making fraudulent misrepresentations to the public. In
an attempt to protect and benefit the public, courts have utilized
the same clean hands doctrine to refuse to grant injunctions and
damages as was used to deny copyright protection in the immo-
rality and illegality cases, and as used in Stone, the case involving
copyright fraud. More recently trademark law has drawn closer
to the copyright decisions by precluding registration of trade-
marks consisting of "immoral, deceptive, or scandalous mat-
ter."74 This statutory authority offers protection of the public
interest where copyright and patent statutory authority is still
lacking, but the case law analogy is strong evidence that the
public interest to be preserved is the same.
2. Patent Cases
In the patent area the clean hands doctrine is freely used to
protect the public interest. Although the cases do not deal neces-
sarily with fraud, the rationale has been to deny protection where
abuse of the patent privilege has been detrimental to the public
interest. Two cases involve an attempt by the manufacturer of a
patented device to license the use of such device only to those
consumers who agree to buy an unpatented product from that
Clotworthy v. Schepp, 42 F. 62 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1890).
72 Krauss v. Jos. R. Peebles' Sons Co., 58 F. 585 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1893).
Hilson Co. v. Foster, 80 F. 896 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1897).
15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1970).
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company.75 The result is the use of a patent privilege to create a
monopoly in an unpatented product. This abuse of the patent
privilege was considered unclean hands by the Supreme Court
which denied protection in the infringement action saying:
The grant to the inventor of the special privilege of a patent
monopoly carries out a public policy adopted by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, "to promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to. . . Inventors the
exclusive Right . . . " to their "new and useful" inventions ....
It equally forbids the use of the patent to secure an exclusive right
or limited monopoly not granted by the Patent Office and which it
is contrary to public policy to grant.
It is a principle of general application that courts, and espe-
cially courts of equity, may appropriately wifthhold their aid where
the plaintiff is using the right asserted contrary to the public inter-
est. 0
The clean hands doctrine is not only used where the given
privilege is abused, but also to protect the public interest from
patents which do not benefit the public. Two cases, for example,
involved infringement of patented devices which the court found
to be used exclusively for gambling." The courts refused patent
protection because the devices were not "useful" as per the Con-
stitution and were against the public policy since their only use
was an immoral one. The courts did state that the patents would
be upheld if a legitimate use was found for the devices.78 This is
similar to the copyright cases discussed above.
The clean hands doctrine has also been employed, in the
public interest, where the conduct of the patentee has been de-
ceitful or fraudulent. In Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excava-
tor Co.79 the plaintiff held a patent on a device used in ditch-
"' Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942). The manufacturer of a
patented salt dispensing machine required the licensees of the dispenser to use its salt
tablets which were unpatented. The Court stated:
A patent operates to create and grant to the patentee an exclusive right to
make, use and vend the particular device described and claimed in the
patent. But a patent affords no immunity for a monopoly not within the
grant . . . . and the use of it to suppress competition in the sale of an
unpatented article may deprive the patentee of the aid of a court of equity
to restrain an alleged infringement by one who is a competitor.
Id. at 491; B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942).
7' Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942).
7 Reliance Novelty Co. v. Dworzek, 80 F. 902 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897); National Auto-
matic Device Co. v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1889).
11 The patent definition of immorality has undergone a transition similar to that in
obscenity.
71 290 U.S. 240 (1933).
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cutting machinery. The plaintiff discovered that the device had
been previously used and experimented with by another. The
plaintiff then went to this other person and colluded with him to
assign his rights to the plaintiff so the plaintiff could prosecute
an infringement action. The plaintiff suppressed the evidence of
the prior use and, instead, claimed they were abandoned experi-
ments. The court, after uncovering the misrepresentations of fact,
denied relief stating that the plaintiff must have a good faith
claim and come into equity with clean hands. A similar case was
International Biotical Corp. v. Associated Mills, Inc.s0 wherein
the plaintiff held a patent and a copyright, but made misrepre-
sentations to the court and the copyright office, and to the public
through his copyrighted material. Relief was denied on the
grounds of the plaintiff's unclean hands and inequitable conduct.
Another principle case in this area was Precision Instrument
Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive M.M. Co."' In that case the
plaintiff attempted to enforce a patent which the plaintiff knew
to be tainted by fraud and perjury. The plaintiff had entered into
agreements to assign the patent rights to itself and to settle an
interference proceeding to prevent revealing to the Patent Office
the true nature of the patent claim. The Supreme Court refused
to enforce this patent claim, stating:
These facts all add up to the inescapable conclusion that [the
plaintiff) has not displayed that standard of conduct requisite to
the maintenance of this suit in equity. That the actions of [the
defendants] may have been more reprehensible is immaterial. The
public policy against the assertion and enforcement of patent claims
infected with fraud and perjury is too great to be overridden by such
a consideration .2
The Court, in applying the clean hands doctrine to deny patent
protection in this case, emphasized the public interest involved
in such an application of the doctrine:
Moreover, where a suit in equity concerns the public interest as
well as the private interests of the litigants this doctrine assumes
even wider and more significant proportions. For if an equity court
properly uses the maxim to withhold its assistance in such a case it
not only prevents a wrongdoer from enjoying the fruits of his trans-
gression but averts an injury to the public. The determination of
when the maxim should be applied to bar this type of suit thus
becomes of vital significance. ...
239 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. Il1. 1964).
81 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
" Id. at 819.
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' * * A patent by its very nature is affected with a public inter-
est . . . . The farreaching social and economic consequences of a
patent, therefore, give a paramount interest in seeing that patent
monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other ine-
quitable conduct and that such monopolies are kept within their
legitimate scope. The facts of this case must accordingly be mea-
sured by both public and private standards of equity. ....
3. The Analogy to Fraud in Copyright
Both trademark and patent law are concerned with the pub-
lic interest, and where an individual threatens that public inter-
est through fraudulent reprsentations or fraudulent conduct, the
courts have been quick to deny him any relief. The nature of
either'trademark or patent law is very akin to copyright law in
this respect. Hence, the treatment of fraudulent material in each
of these areas of the law should be analogous. The Supreme Court
recognized such an analogy in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger
Co. 14 stating:
It is the adverse effect upon the public interest of a successful in-
fringement suit, in conjunction with the patentee's course of con-
duct, which disqualifies him to maintain the suit, regardless of
whether the particular defendant has suffered from the misuse of the
patent. Similarly equity will deny relief for infringement of a trade-
mark vhere the plaintiff is misrepresenting to the public the nature
of his product either by the trademark itself or by his label. [case
citations omitted]; see also, for application of the like doctrine in
the case of copyright, Edward Thompson Co. v. American Law Book
Co., 122 F. 922, 926; Stone & M'Carrick v. Dugan Piano Co., 220 F.
837, 841-43. The patentee, like these other holders of an exclusive
privilege granted in the furtherance of a public policy, may not
claim protection of his grant by the courts where it is being used to
subvert that policy.5
Despite the precedent set by previous copyright fraud cases,
and the overwhelming parallels from immoral and illegal copy-
right cases, and even the strong analogies to fraudulent trade-
mark and patent cases, the court produced a curious turnabout
in Belcher by granting copyright protection to a work which was
allegedly fraudulent. An analysis of the rationale of the court in
Belcher is necessary to shed some light on this issue.
II. ANALYSIS OF Belcher v. Tarbox
The issue in Belcher was the same issue which plagued ear-
lier courts, that is, whether false and fraudulent material was the
11 Id. at 815-16.
314 U.S. 488 (1942).
0 Id. at 494.
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subject of copyright protection or whether the equitable clean
hands doctrine should be applied to deny such protection. The
majority based its decision to grant copyright protection on three
rationales. First, the majority stated, "There is nothing in the
Copyright Act to suggest that the courts are to pass upon the
truth or falsity, the soundness or unsoundness, of the views em-
bodied in a copyrighted work.""6 As was indicated in the discus-
sion above, no specific statutory authority exists to grant courts
the power to review the content of any given work and then deny
it copyright on the basis of such content. The constitutional au-
thority granted to Congress requires that the protected works
"promote the progress of science and the useful arts," but a literal
application of this rule might destroy protection in many works
now copyrighted. 7 In this respect, the majority is accurate in
declining to deny protection on the basis of content. The dissent,
however, points out that, despite a dearth of authority, the courts
have frequently supported the spirit of the copyright law, the
avowed purpose to benefit the public, and have denied protection
to immoral or illegal works by using equity principles without, in
fact, denying the copyright. By analogy, then, the court should
protect the public interest by prohibiting protection of fraudulent
works, absent statutory authority to do so.
Secondly, the majority states:
The gravity and immensity of the problems, theological, philosophi-
cal, economic and scientific, that would confront a court if this view
[the use of the clean hands doctrine to deny protection] were
adopted are staggering to contemplate. It is surely not a task lightly
to be assumed, and we decline the invitation to assume it."
This presents two issues. First the court is fearful of opening the
floodgates of litigation. The majority assumes that adoption of a
policy of censuring works to determine if they benefit the public
will invite parties to bring actions to test the validity of a copy-
right. The dissent counters with the argument that such a fear is
unfounded since only two cases have actually challenged the
fraudulent content of a work in this century, i.e., Stone and
Advisers. Furthermore, it can be asserted that it is a weak court
and weak argument that rejects the opportunity to seek justice
in the face of an onerous task in terms of work volume. It is
interesting to note, however, that the Attorney General recog-
486 F.2d at 1088.
HOWELL, supra note 63, at 12. See also 1 NIMMER, supra note 5, § 3.2 at 6.7.
486 F.2d at 1088.
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nized the inability of the Register of Copyrights to screen every
application his agency receives because of the sheer volume of it."5
If this administrative agency would encounter such problems, it
is a fair argument that the courts would have the same problems.
The second issue is that the courts would have to be prepared to
listen to a great variety of cases. This would require: (1) that
judges be knowledgeable enough in many areas to recognize
fraud; and (2) that courts create a uniform and practical criterion
for judging what is, and is not, fraudulent. This would indeed be
a great burden on the courts, but not an insurmountable one. As
the dissent points out, courts hear cases of fraud every day. Why
should it be difficult or different to hear cases of fraud in copy-
right? On the other hand, such criteria are not so easily fixed. If
the development of obscenity law in this country offers any indi-
cation, then changing social values result in changing criteria for
assessing the social morality. This has been demonstrated in
court decisions from the 19th century, where courts refused pro-
tection to indecent plays and books, to the present, where courts
apply criteria like "utterly without social redeeming value" and
"appealing to prurient interests."" ° Perhaps the analogy is over-
drawn since fraud is a legal concept that is enduring while ob-
scenity is a moral concept which changes with society. Or is fraud
so enduring?
The third rationale of the majority is based on the intent of
the Copyright Act. The majority expressed its concern for the
public interest by seeking the best manner possible to protect
that interest. The court states:
Copyright protection restricts permissible publication. We fail
to see what public policy would be served by eliminating this restric-
tion in the case of fraudulent matter and permitting it to be re-
printed and circulated freely."
This argument seems sound, but the dissent offers an equally
sound counterpoint:
" 41 Op. Arr'Y GEN. 396 (1958). The opinion states:
The Register has advised me that facilities of the office make intensive
screening of works presented practically impossible. It has a staff of some
thirty-five examiners which receives more than 1,000 applications daily.
Therefore, examinations of any more than the question whether the works
involved meet the specific statutory requirements of the act may be regarded
as not feasible admisistratively.
Id. at 401-02.
" See 1 NIMMER, supra note 5, § 3.2 at 6.7-6.8, and § 36 at 146.29; Comment, supra
note 44, at 124-26. See also 41 Op. ATT'y GEN. 396, 401 (1958).
1, 486 F.2d at 1088 n.3
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A copyright is in the nature of a privilege . . . . Such a privilege
should not be abused by granting copyright protection to material
which is used to defraud the public ....
. . . The public interest is to protect members of the public
from being defrauded. While granting copyright protection of fraud-
ulent material will assure that only one person will defraud members
of the public with a single fraudulent scheme . . . it will not insure
that any fewer members of the public will be defrauded by this
single scheme. By allowing copyright protection to such material,
the law is not only condoning fraud but is placing its power, endorse-
ment and support behind fraudulent works."
The majority suggests that the best way to serve the public inter-
est is to grant the copyright protection against the infringer, while
the dissent suggests that the public is benefited most by denying
copyright protection to the deceiving author. This dichotomy be-
tween the majority and the dissent is based on differing views of
the nature of copyrights. The majority views copyright in the
nature of a restriction on publication and, therefore, seeks to
promote the public interest by restricting publication of fraudu-
lent material. The dissent, meanwhile, views copyright in the
nature of a privilege to the author and, therefore, seeks to pro-
mote the public interest by denying the privilege to one who
would abuse it by defrauding the public.
These divergent views leave a basic issue unresolved. If the
purpose of copyright law is to encourage works which will benefit
the public, and the purpose of the courts is to protect the public
interest within copyright law, then how do the courts best serve
that purpose? Should the court grant an injunction preventing
the defendant from reproducing the plaintiffs work, and thereby
encourage the plaintiff to defraud the public by granting him the
court's endorsement, or should the court deny protection, and
thereby encourage the defendant to freely reproduce the fraudu-
lent work? Clearly the courts do not want to endorse'a fraudulent
scheme, but following the denial of an injunction in Southey v.
Sherwood, 3 Lord Campbell commented, "So the injunction was
refused; and hundreds of thousands of copies of Wat Tyler, at the
price of one penny, were circulated over the kingdom." 4 This
illustrates that a denial of copyright protection does not protect
the public from dissemination of the material, but may in fact
foster it. So, the dilemma remains. The purpose is to serve and
Id. at 1090.
35 Eng. Rep. 1006 (Ch. 1817).
10 LivEs OF THE CHANCELLORS 257, (5th English ed.), quoted in DRONE, supra note
37, at 113 n.1.
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protect the public interest, but there is no clear path. It might
be said, therefore, that it is impossible to discern whether the
court in Belcher adhered to the spirit of the Copyright Act and
the Consitution by permitting copyright protection.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF Belcher
Belcher does not represent a radical shift in the development
of copyright law. Its result is not unlike that of Advisers. The
importance of Belcher, however, stems from its value as a re-
minder that serious problems exist in copyright law to which no
definite solutions have been made. Three related issues lurk be-
hind this case and all similar cases. The first issue deals with the
problem of using equity principles to solve copyright law ques-
tions. As was pointed out above, the courts have been reluctant
to deny copyright in any work which was immoral or illegal. In-
stead, the courts have utilized the equitable clean hands doctrine
to merely deny copyright protection to such works by refusing to
grant an injunction or damages against the pirate of the work.
This is done under the pretext of protecting the public interest.
The clean hands doctrine, however, must be asserted as an af-
firmative defense before the court will act upon it. This is the
irony. It is the defendant, guilty himself of pirating a work which
he believed had sufficient value to earn him a profit, who asserts
the affirmative defense of the plaintiff's unclean hands. Then the
court punishes the plaintiff for having labored to create such an
immoral or illegal work by denying the injunction, while the de-
fendant continues to perpetrate the obscenity or fraud for profit.
The court, of course, has acted in the public interest, but the
defendant has not. One solution to this illogical inequity is that
if equity is the game, it should be played both ways. The court,
therefore, should also apply equitable principles to the conduct
of the defendant who is guilty of piracy. If this were done, the
defendant would then be estopped from asserting the affirmative
defense of unclean hands against the plaintiff. 5 This solution,
though equitable, is not satisfactory since the purpose of copy-
right law is to protect the public interest.
Another solution might be to stop using equity principles and
simply deny the copyright to any such work, but this may be
unsatisfactory because of the burden imposed by the need to
screen every potential copyright work.
,1 Comment, supra note 44, at 111 n.8.
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This leads to the second problematic issue. In any copyright
case should judges sit as censors to determine what is immoral
or fraudulent? This issue has raised much debate. Justice Story
brought up the problem that every judge passing judgment on a
work would be tempted to stifle the free exchange of new ideas if
he found such views opposed to his own views." Justice Holmes
elaborated in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.97 by ex-
plaining that judges censoring works might deny copyright to a
work which might appeal to a public less educated than the
judge, but which still had sufficient value to the public. Failure
to grant such copyright would not serve the public interest and,
therefore, be contrary to the intent of the Copyright Act." If
equity in copyright cases is inequitable, then who but the judges
could determine the copyrightability of each published work? Yet
2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 938 (5th ed. 1849).
The soundness of this general principle can hardly admit of question.
The chief embarrassment and difficulty lie in the application of it to particu-
lar cases. If a Court of Equity, under color of its general authority, is to enter
upon all the moral, theological, metaphysical, and political inquiries, which,
in the past times, have given rise to so many controversies, and in the future
may well be supposed to provoke many heated discussions, and if it is to
decide dogmatically upon the character and bearing of such discussions, and
the rights of authors, growing out of them; it is obvious, that an absolute
power is conferred over the subject of literary property, which may sap the
very foundations, on which it rests, and retard, if not entirely suppress, the
means of arriving at physical, as well as metaphysical truths. Thus, for
example, a Judge, who should happen to believe, that the immateriality of
the soul, as well as its immortality, was a doctrine clearly revealed in the
Scriptures, (a point, upon which very learned and pious minds have been
greatly divided,) would deem any work anti-christian, which should profess
to deny that point, and would refuse an injunction to protect it. So, a Judge,
who should be a Trinitarian, might most conscientiously decide against
granting an injunction in favor of an author, enforcing Unitarian views; when
another Judge, of opposite opinions, might not hesitate to grant it.
Id. at 268.
,7 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
" Id. at 251-52. The Court stated:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, out-
side of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme, some
works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would
make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which
the author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance, whether the
etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been sure of protec-
tion when seen for the first time. At the other end, copyright would be denied
to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if
they command the interest of any public, they have a commercial value-it
would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and educational
value-and the taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt.
Id. at 251.
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under such a system, is there not the great peril that our coveted
freedom of speech, the backbone of democracy, might be compro-
mised by the natural biases of individual judges?
If equity fails and judicial censorship fails, then is there fault
in the system? Yes. The problem lies in the fact that in all the
cases wherein copyright is in issue, the action is brought by the
plaintiff-author or publisher of the questioned work against the
defendant-pirate who infringed such work. Yet, the court which
purportedly sits as the mediator between these two litigants, in
fact, sits as the representative of the public who joins in the
action as a third party protecting its own interests. Rather than
seeking justice as between the parties at bar, the court seeks only
to protect the public interest, that trust which was granted in the
Copyright Act. The result is that when the guilty defendant con-
fesses his guilt but pleads that the work in question has a suspi-
cious nature, the court, in its role as public protector, punishes
the plaintiff for his sins against society. Then the defendant,
guilty as he is, is rewarded for uncovering the plaintiff's crime. It
is, therefore, the system which is at fault, and the Belcher case,
with its majority and dissenting opinions, is nothing more than a
representation of the struggles of the system attempting to deliver
justice and protect the public simultaneously.
CONCLUSION
The purpose and intent of copyright law is to benefit the
public, yet there is no statutory authority granting the courts the
power to restrict or permit the copyright of fraudulent material.
The case law offers no concrete precedent in this area, though by
analogy to copyright of immoral or illegal works and analogy to
fraud in trademark and patent law, the indication is that courts
are reluctant to protect any work which tends to adversely affect
the public interest. The problem with these precedents, however,
is that the application of equity principles to copyright law un-
justly permits one guilty party to continue his inequitable con-
duct while failing to provide the greatest public benefit. This
problem results from the structure of copyright litigation which
places the court in the dual role of mediator between the litigants
and representative of the public interest. It is the system, there-
fore, which creates injustice. The conclusion is simple. The sys-
tem must be altered in some way to allow the public, as its own
representative, to bring to bar any author or publisher who seeks
to perpetrate immorality, illegality, or fraud upon it. But where
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the court is called upon to sit as arbitrator between an author and
the pirate who is profiting from the author's labors, the court
must seek only justice as between those individuals.
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